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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),2 which codified
the enforceability of arbitration agreements3 in expansive, wholesale language.4

*The author would like to thank her husband for his unconditional support and her mother
for her tireless encouragement.
1
In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d 279, 288 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005). This case essentially
determined that the McCarran Act “reverse pre-empted” the Federal Arbitration Act so that
the states could effectively regulate the business of insurance independently. In other words,
arbitration notice requirements are not preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act if they are
enacted regarding the business of insurance.
2

9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2008).
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“The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive
rules under the Commerce Clause.”5 The FAA provides that “a contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . arising
out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”6 In a series of later cases, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
FAA’s broad rule of enforceability as applying to both consumers and merchants in
federal and state courts.7 Most recently in Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,8
the Court held that states were preempted from enacting substantive legislation
regarding arbitration, and that even legislation concerning a simple notice
requirement9 would be invalidated as conflicting with the “goals and policies” of the
FAA.10
By preempting the states from regulating certain aspects of arbitration,
specifically the process associated with agreeing to arbitration, the Court has left a
gaping hole of unregulated territory in this alternative adjudicatory forum.11 The
Court’s acquiescence and restrictions on state legislation, although once intended to
“make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts,”12 has “elevate[d]
arbitration provisions [to a standing] above all other contractual provisions.”13 The

3

The definition of an arbitration agreement is “a contractual provision mandating
arbitration – and thereby avoiding litigation – of disputes about the contracting parties’ rights,
duties and liabilities.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 113 (8th ed. 1999).
4

9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008).

5

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984).

6

Id. at 1-2 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). When Congress and the Supreme Court say that states
are only entitled to revoke an arbitration agreement on grounds as exist “at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract [they are referring to] traditional contract defenses such as
fraud, duress and unconscionability.” Ann E. Krasuski, Mandatory Arbitration Agreements
Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263,
272-73 (2004).
7
See Keating, 465 U.S. at 11-14 (noting that the Court’s language in Prima Paint (that
Congress draws its authority for the FAA from the Commerce Clause) indicates that the FAA
was intended to apply in federal as well as in state courts) ; see also Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1996); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-05 (1967).
8

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 688.

11

Arbitration is defined as “a method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral
third parties who are usu. agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 112 (8th ed. 1999).
12
13

See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 n.12.

See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black’s concerns that
the majority’s holding would have the eventual effect of raising arbitration agreements to a
position above ordinary contracts is exemplified in the detrimental effects (such as forcing
nursing home residents that unknowingly enter into arbitration agreements to keep the
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consequence is that state legislatures are foreclosed from enacting even minimal
safeguards to protect unwary consumers, and courts can only cure unconscionable
arbitration agreements on a case-by-case basis.
In nursing homes, preemption has created an arbitration crisis,14 whereby
potential residents are passively compelled to sign contracts that contain binding,
pre-dispute arbitration clauses as a condition of being admitted to the facility. This
unregulated process is wrought with insurmountable obstacles15 which collectively
deter residents from obtaining redress in either a court of law or the arbitral forum.16
Federal legislation is essential to restore fundamental principles of contract law17 and

agreement to arbitrate) that the FAA’s general rule of enforceability has had in the context of
nursing homes.
14

See Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 159 Ohio App. 3d 66, 823 N.E.2d 19 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2004) (involving an arbitration agreement that contained a loser pays provision that was
presented to the spouse of the future resident in a frantic admissions process and was
determined to rise to the level of procedural unconscionability); see also Fortune v. Castle
Nursing Homes Inc., 843 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (involving a nursing home
arbitration agreement that contained a loser pays provision that the Court held was
substantively unconscionable because it required the nursing home resident to pay the nursing
home’s attorney fees if the resident did not prevail at the arbitration hearing); see also
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and
Alternative Motion to Refer to Binding Arbitration at 3, Day v. Waterford Commons, No.
05994 (Court Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Brief for the Plaintiff] (involving a nursing home
admission agreement that contained an arbitration clause on the twelfth page of a fourteen
page contract as well as a loser pays provision requiring Day to pay Waterford Commons’
costs and attorney fees if she lost at the arbitral hearing).
15

The process of arbitration entails several obstacles that make it extremely difficult to
obtain redress. These obstacles are especially problematic in nursing homes. Some of the
obstacles facing residents in nursing homes that wish to obtain redress for injuries include onesided terms (such as when the nursing home maintains the right to go to court and dispute
unpaid fees), “loser pays provisions” (which require the resident loser of an arbitration hearing
to pay the nursing home facilities costs), prohibitive costs and outcomes that are statistically
slanted in favor of businesses. These obstacles are worsened by the fact that the typical
claimant in a nursing home is elderly and possibly unable to physically endure the process of
arbitration. These obstacles are also worsened by the typical claim in a nursing home, which
generally involves negligence, which is not well suited to the process of arbitration because of
the lengthy fact-finding procedures involved in that type of claim.
16

Residents are deterred from obtaining redress in a court of law because nursing home
arbitration clauses forfeit the resident’s statutorily defined right to a hearing before a jury.
Residents are deterred from obtaining redress in the arbitral forum because of the obstacles
which make obtaining redress difficult such as prohibitive costs, one-sided terms, “loser pays
provisions,” and slanted outcomes. Moreover, “these arbitration agreements may be good for
nursing homes, but they are expensive proceedings in a forum generally unfavorable to
consumers.” Krasuski, supra note 6, at 273.
17
See generally Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority’s holding in Prima Paint, that the FAA was generally enforceable upon the states,
violated basic principles of contract law, mainly, to honor the intent of the parties at the time
the contract was formed; implying that the general enforceability of the FAA could work to
enforce an arbitration agreement that was unknowingly entered into).
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fairness to nursing home admission agreements which, due to the lack of regulation,
have been abandoned in favor of “administrative convenience.”18
Section II provides a brief history of arbitration in consumer contracts, and the
development of federal and state legislation condoning the practice of arbitrating
consumer disputes. Section III analyzes United States Supreme Court decisions that
have interpreted the FAA to preempt state legislation regarding arbitration. Section
IV discusses the aftermath of preemption and unregulated arbitration in nursing
homes. Section V considers the future plight of nursing home residents if the system
is permitted to continue without regulation. Section VI of this Note proposes a
solution to alleviate the arbitration crisis in nursing homes that will maintain the
viability of arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Finally, section VII suggests
state guidelines to regulate the process of agreeing to arbitrate in nursing homes that
will protect the interests of both nursing home facilities and residents, while more
adequately fulfilling the original intent of Congress when it enacted the FAA.
II. HISTORY & LEGISLATION
Historically, arbitration agreements between merchants were utilized to ensure an
efficient forum for dispute resolution19 regarding recurrent business issues.20
Common law courts were hesitant, however, to permit pre-dispute arbitration
agreements to infiltrate the business dealings of merchants and consumers.21 The
common law courts distrusted arbitration agreements between merchants and
consumers because it “meant [a] loss of the right to litigate.”22 Moreover, “courts
were worried that a stronger party might take advantage of a weaker party by forcing
the latter to agree to arbitration instead of litigation.”23
18
See Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St. 3d 266, 268, 865 N.E.2d 9, 12 (2007)
(quoting Note, H.B. 600: Ohio’s Bill of Rights for Nursing Home Patients, 5 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 507, 508-509 (1980)).
19
Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24 (discussing the courts concern that the initial reasons that
arbitration agreements were enforced is inapplicable to some consumer disputes).
20

At common law, arbitration agreements were utilized between merchants that wanted to
quickly resolve disputes arising under a contract and then summarily remain in the contract
after disposition of the issue. This is much different than the use of arbitration today.
Arbitration hearings today between merchants and consumers, generally surround a dispute
regarding the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself, and/or one party’s desire to end the
contractual relationship subsequent to the arbitration hearing as opposed to remaining in it and
continuing the contractual relationship.
21

See JIANG ZHAODONG, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
AGREEMENTS 12-13 (U.M.I. Dissertation Services) (1993).
22

A STUDY OF
ARBITRATION

Id. at 12. Common law courts were concerned about the loss of the right to litigate
because by agreeing to an arbitration clause, an individual typically forfeits his or her right to
obtain redress in a court of law. Today, common law concerns have become a reality in that
courts are routinely determining the conscionability of contracts that contain arbitration
clauses. Generally, consumers claim that they did not know about, did not understand, or that
they were not thoroughly explained what the agreement entailed at the formation of the
contract and should therefore not be bound to arbitration.
23

Id. at 12-13.
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Despite these concerns, modern arbitration steadily progressed and in 1925 the
FAA codified the enforceability of arbitration agreements in expansive terms.24 The
FAA was enacted to guarantee that courts would enforce arbitration agreements.25
Critics argue that when Congress enacted the FAA, it “did not intend to enforce
arbitration agreements that had been foisted [upon] ignorant consumers, and it did
not intend to prevent states from protecting weaker parties.”26 Therefore, although
the FAA was originally “intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities
of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power, a series of United States
Supreme Court decisions changed the meaning of the Act.”27
Today,28 the FAA has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to “extend to
disputes between parties of greatly disparate economic power.”29 Moreover,
Supreme Court decisions have forced states to enact compliant legislation regarding
arbitration in consumer contracts as opposed to carving out exceptions to effectively
protect consumers from certain types of contracts.30 Critics argue that these
consequences are not an accurate representation of Congress’ initial intent when it
enacted the FAA.31
The Ohio Arbitration Act (Act)32 is one example of a compliant state statute
modeled after the provisions of the FAA. The language of the Act is representative
of other state arbitration statutes33 and is indistinguishable from that of the FAA.34

24

9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008).

25

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos, v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995) (citing Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)).
26

Robert Hornstein, The Fiction of Freedom of Contract - - Nursing Home Admission
Contract Arbitration Agreements: A Primer on Preserving the Right of Access to Court Under
Florida Law, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 319, 323 (2003). Whatever Congress’ initial intent
was, the practical implication of the FAA is that a general, uniform rule of enforceability has
been adopted and maintained as opposed to a more equitable subjective application that would
enable the states to restrict unconscionable practices.
27

The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 1(2), 2(2) (2007).

28

“In an effort to insulate themselves from litigation and what defendants often
characterize as the ‘run away jury,’ nursing homes have increasingly turned to arbitration.
[M]ost of the nation’s largest nursing home chains, including Integrated Health Services,
Beverly Industries, and Mariner, include arbitration agreements in their admissions packets.”
Krasuski, supra note 6, at 267-68.
29

The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(2) (2007).

30
See generally Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681-88 (invalidating a very minimal guideline
imposed by the Montana legislature requiring notice of the arbitration agreement “typed in
underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract,” as contradictory to the purposes of
the FAA).
31

See generally The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(2) (2007).

32

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-.24 (West 2008).

33

See generally National Center for State Courts, Arbitration Contracts and Procedures,
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/StateLinks.asp?id=9# (last visited Dec. 1, 2008)
(listing the different state statutes that represent each states comparable arbitration legislation).
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However, history35 and recent case law suggest that state compliance with the FAA’s
broad enforceability rule is not at will.36 Recognizing the inequity of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in nursing homes, states have enacted nursing home bills of
rights which generally provide residents with a statutory civil cause of action against
violations of a multitude of enumerated residents’ rights.37 Nursing homes, however,
have circumvented this protection by requiring residents to waive these causes of
action in the admissions agreement.38 Moreover, state statutes that have attempted to
codify exceptions to protect the weaker party in transactions have been invalidated39
by a string of Supreme Court decisions interpreting the FAA to preempt any
substantive state legislation in this field.40
34

The Ohio Arbitration Act applies to written contracts and expressly declares them
“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” § 2711(A). This language is exactly the same as the language in
the FAA. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008). The Ohio Arbitration Act has similarly been
interpreted to create a presumption of validity regarding the enforceability of written contracts
containing arbitration agreements. OHCONSL § 21:3.
35

See generally Keating, 465 U.S. at 14 (discussing reasons why Congress might have
enacted the FAA, such as “old common law hostility toward arbitration and the failure of state
arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements”).
36

See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681 (invalidating a Montana statute that required minimal
notice requirements in contracts containing arbitration clauses on the first page of the
document to ensure that certain contracts were entered into knowingly); see also Keating, 465
U.S. at 14 (evincing a history of dissatisfaction with arbitration agreements in consumer
contracts among the states).
37
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681 (regarding a Montana state law requiring minimal notice
requirements in contracts containing arbitration clauses that was struck down as violating the
“goals and policies” of the FAA as interpreted by the Supreme Court).
38

See generally Small, 823 N.E.2d at 22 (providing that “the parties understand that by
signing this agreement that they are agreeing to waive their rights to sue in a court of law and
are agreeing to arbitrate disputes”); see generally Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 4
(providing the arbitration clause used by Waterford Commons nursing home which generally
forfeits the resident’s right to obtain relief in a court of law upon agreeing to the terms of the
arbitration clause)
39

See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688 (holding that the Montana state law requiring minimal
notice requirements for the use of arbitration agreements was preempted by the FAA).
40
See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688 (holding that the FAA preempted the Montana state law
requiring minimal notice of an arbitration clause in certain types of contracts); see also
Dobson, 513 U.S. at 272-74 (concluding that the FAA does not use language that would allow
states to create exceptions to the general enforceability of arbitration agreements); see also
Volt Info, Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 478-79 (adopting the Court’s language in Keating and again
endorsing the general enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA); see also Perry
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempted a California law
regarding arbitration)); see also Keating, 465 U.S. at 10-14 (stating that the FAA is applicable
to consumers in federal and state court under Congress’ Commerce Clause authority); see also
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1983) (reaffirming
the notion that the FAA creates federal substantive law “establishing a duty to honor an
agreement to arbitrate,” but also noting that the FAA is “an anomaly in the field of federalcourt jurisdiction”); see also Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-06 (establishing the bedrock
principle relied upon in subsequent opinions that the FAA creates substantive law binding on
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III. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE FAA
The first significant Supreme Court decision interpreting the FAA as preempting
state legislation arose in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.,41
where the parties to a dispute, challenging the validity of an arbitration agreement,
arrived in federal court upon diversity jurisdiction. In Prima Paint,
one party . . . alleged that the other had committed fraud in the
inducement of the contract, although not of [the] arbitration clause in
particular, and sought to have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal
court. The Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule,
consideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract ‘is for the
arbitrators and not for the courts.’42
The Supreme Court also held that “a federal court may consider only issues relating
to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate,”43 thus prohibiting
federal courts from considering the merits. Essentially, the Court declared that the
FAA “creates federal substantive law requiring the parties to honor arbitration
agreements,”44 and that this law is “applicable in state and federal court.”45
Additionally, the majority emphasized that “the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to
make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so,”46
and to provide a “speedy [forum] . . . not subject to delay and obstruction in the
courts.”47
Justice Black, writing for the dissent in Prima Paint, argued that the majority’s
position “approve[d] a rule which is not only contrary to state law, but contrary to
the intention of the parties and to accepted principles of contract law - a rule which . .
. elevates arbitration provisions above all other contractual provisions.”48 Justice
Black’s dissent in Prima Paint accurately predicted the future impact of a federal
statute broadly endorsing arbitration and preempting states from narrowing the force
of that breadth. Justice Black’s concerns are embodied in the obstacles that nursing
home residents face today in obtaining redress as a result of unregulated pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.49
both federal and state courts under Congress’ Commerce Clause authority that effectively
preempts any substantive state legislation regarding arbitration agreements individually).
41

Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395.

42

Keating, 465 U.S. at 11 (quoting Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400).

43

Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404.

44

Keating, 465 U.S. at 16 n.9 (interpreting and reinstating the holding in Prima Paint that
the FAA is substantive legislation preempting state legislation) (emphasis added).
45

Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

46

Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 n.12 (emphasis added).

47

Id.

48

Id. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

49

Nursing home residents that agree to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their admission
agreement will face many obstacles to obtaining redress that would not be encountered if a
similar case was litigated in a court of law. Examples of these obstacles (which are discussed
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The second landmark Supreme Court decision interpreting the FAA occurred in
Southland Corp. v. Keating,50 in which the Court spoke more specifically about the
issue of explicitly preempting state legislation. In Keating, franchisees brought an
action against the franchisor “alleging . . . fraud, breach of contract and violation of
disclosure requirements.”51 The Court held that section 2 of the FAA “withdraws the
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”52 Moreover, the Court noted
that “Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the
enforceability of arbitration agreements,”53 and “provided for revocation of
arbitration agreements only upon grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”54
In Keating, Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion argued that when the FAA
was enacted, Congress only intended to “create uniform law binding . . . in the
federal courts.”55 Moreover, Justice O’Connor noted that “although arbitration is a
worthy alternative to litigation, [the majority’s] exercise in judicial revisionism
[went] too far.”56 Similar to Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Prima Paint,
Justice O’Connor’s predictions regarding the impact of the broad enforceability of
arbitration are exemplified by the arbitration crisis in nursing homes occurring as a
direct result of an unregulated system. Justice O’Connor’s dissent supports the
proposition that although arbitration may operate as an efficient alternative to
litigation in some commercial settings,57 it can amount to a severely inadequate
system of dispute resolution in certain contexts;58 the FAA, however, makes no
exceptions.
later in this paper) include one-sided terms, loser pays provisions, adhesion contracts,
prohibitive costs and slanted outcomes in the arbitral forum.
50

Keating, 465 U.S. at 1.

51

Id. at 1, syllabus.

52

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 684 (quoting Keating, 465 U.S. at 10).

53

Keating, 465 U.S. at 16.

54

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 685 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).

55

Keating, 465 U.S. at 35 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

56

Id. at 36.

57

See generally Ernst & Young, L.L.P., Outcomes of Arbitration: An Empirical Study of
Consumer Lending Cases 1 (2004) [hereinafter Ernst & Young]. Critics argue that the
benefits of arbitration that are possibly realized in commercial settings cannot be imputed to
consumer disputes. This study, along with many other studies attempting to show the “merit
of consumer disputes,” has been regarded as of “questionable value.” The Ernst & Young
study has been predominantly criticized because it claims to “examine the merits of
arbitration as compared to litigation, [however] the study does not [actually] examine
outcomes for comparable cases in litigation.” F. PAUL BLAND, JR., MICHAEL J. QUIRK,
LESLIE A. BAILEY, RICHARD H. FRANKEL & JONATHAN SHELDON, CONSUMER
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 2 (4TH ed. 2006).
58
See Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24 (holding that it was procedurally unconscionable to require
Mrs. Small to dispute her claims in the arbitral forum because of the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the contract, i.e., that she was under a great deal of stress, that
she was over 69 years of age, that she had no particular legal experience and was not
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Finally, in 1996, the Supreme Court decided Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto,59 in which the Court’s language, while merely reaffirming its holdings in
Prima Paint and Keating, went much further than its previous decisions. In
Casarotto, Montana’s state legislature had enacted a “first-page notice requirement
which govern[ed] . . . contracts subject to arbitration.” The notice provision stated
that:
notice that a contract is subject to arbitration pursuant to this chapter shall
be typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract; and
unless such notice is displayed thereon, the contract may not be subject to
arbitration.60
The Montana provision was enacted to alleviate concerns61 associated with
individuals that unknowingly enter into adhesion contracts subject to binding
arbitration.62 The provision’s central agenda was to ensure that a true meeting of the
minds was reached during the formation of contracts containing arbitration clauses.63
In Casarotto, the Court invalidated Montana’s first-page notice requirement on
the grounds that it displaced the purpose of the FAA – specifically, the “goals and
policies of the FAA.”64 Essentially, the Court in Casarotto provided that state courts
may invalidate arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract,” but that state legislatures are not entitled to
accompanied by counsel, and that the terms of the agreement were not explained to her); see
also Fortune 843 N.E.2d at 1221 (holding that the agreement to arbitrate was substantively
unconscionable because it would force Fortune to pay the nursing home’s attorney fees and
costs if she lost at the arbitration hearing, and also noting that these types of provisions could
deter residents from pursuing claims).
59

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681.

60

Id. (citing Mont.Code Ann. § 27-5-114(4)). The Montana statute was enacted in the
process of amending legislation to conform with the FAA. Concern was expressed by the
legislature that a general rule of enforceability, without guidelines on the utilization of
arbitration clauses, would unknowingly submit some individuals, especially elderly
individuals, to the process of obtaining redress only in the arbitral forum. The legislature’s
primary concern was on the impact of the FAA’s general enforceability concerning contracts
of adhesion.
61
“During the consideration of Montana’s Uniform Arbitration Act, the testimony and
legislative statements focused on the positive aspects of arbitration. Concerns were raised,
however, about adhesion contracts. For example, Senator Tom Towe told the Committee
about Nannabelle Nickleberry, an elderly woman who signed a home improvement contract
which required that disputes be arbitrated in New York. In response to such concerns, the
legislation was amended to include the provision at issue in this case.” See United States
Supreme Court Brief for Respondent at 4, Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681
(1996) (No. 95-559) [hereinafter Casarotto Brief].
62

See Casarotto Brief, supra note 61, at 4.

63

In enacting its minimal notice requirement, the Montana legislature sought to do little
more than enforce a basic principle of contract law – that the parties to an agreement entered
into it knowingly and that a true “meeting of the minds” was reached in regard to all of the
terms of the contract, particularly the arbitration agreement.
64

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688.
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codify the rules repeatedly enunciated in those decisions.65 Moreover, the Court
opines that any substantive state legislation on the topic of arbitration is contrary to
the goals and policies of the FAA – even if such legislation is wholly consistent with
the goals and policies of well established principles of contract law.66 In so deciding,
the Court has limited alleviation from unconscionable arbitration agreements to
piecemeal assessment by the courts – a process which has little, if any, deterrent
effect on the unconscionable practices utilized by nursing homes to the detriment of
residents.
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF PREEMPTION: UNREGULATED ARBITRATION
IN NURSING HOMES
A. Unregulated Arbitration in Nursing Homes Creates a Multifaceted System of
Deterrence67
Procedural and substantive unconscionability, prohibitive costs, and slanted
outcomes constitute a few of the deterrents associated with pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in nursing home admission agreements. These deficiencies are the product
of an unregulated system, and are magnified by the unique claim and claimant in the
nursing home environment that are particularly vulnerable to the obstacles of
arbitration. In addition to producing the collective effect of deterring residents’
claims, this system of deterrence also filters claimants according to the extent and
availability of their resources as opposed to the merit of their claims.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
The first aspect of arbitration that serves as an impediment to potential nursing
home litigants seeking redress is procedural. Procedural unconscionability looks to
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract and
involves those factors bearing on the relative bargaining position of the
contracting parties, e.g., age, education, intelligence, business acumen and
experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether

65
Section 2 of the FAA and the United States Supreme Court have repeatedly said that
courts can invalidate agreements to arbitrate on grounds that exist “at law or in equity,” but
that the state legislature is not so similarly situated. What this essentially means for example,
is that Montana courts could repeatedly invalidate nursing home contracts which exhibit
insufficient or even unconscionable notice procedures, but the legislature cannot codify the
decisions that the courts continually enunciate concerning the same recurring practices by
nursing homes. Under these circumstances it is apparent that court decisions are not deterring
nursing homes from their unconscionable practices because it’s almost worth it for the nursing
home to take its chances with the residents that will challenge the validity of the agreement.
66

See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s
general enforceability rule violates (among other things) basic principles of contract law, i.e.,
that a meeting of the minds must be established before a contract will be enforced).
67
This Note proposes that the obstacles associated with obtaining redress for nursing
home residents who are constrained to an arbitration clause, i.e., unconscionability, prohibitive
costs, “loser pays provisions,” one-sided terms, and slanted outcomes, which are magnified by
the typical claim and claimant in the nursing home environment – create a multifaceted system
of deterrence that works to impede nursing home residents from obtaining redress.
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the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alternatives in the
printed terms were possible, [and] whether there were alternative sources
of supply for the goods in question.68
In nursing homes, procedural unconscionability generally concerns the facility’s
inherently superior bargaining power in comparison to the potential residents’ which
is fundamentally weaker.
Intrinsically, contracting for placement in a nursing home suggests that the future
resident seeking care will be of progressed age,69 possibly diminished capacity,70 that
the agreement will be drafted by the nursing home, and that the business acumen of
the resident will be inadequate to protect the rights extinguished by the arbitration
agreement. The typical nursing home resident is aged 85 or older,71 and many times
the process of admission is undergone in a stressful, emergency-type situation.72
Taking these factors into consideration, as well as the fact that arbitration clauses
typically involve forfeiting an individual’s civil cause of action,73 it is difficult to
imagine a nursing home admission agreement, mandating that disputes be submitted
to arbitration that would not entail procedural unconscionability.
In sum, procedural unconscionability prevents residents from pursuing claims in
a court of law by sacrificing their civil cause of action in an arbitration clause
reached through unethical bargaining practices.74 Subsequently, residents deterred
from litigating and faced with the unfamiliar arbitral forum,75 may be discouraged
enough to forego their claims entirely. The lack of arbitration regulation in nursing
homes, and the resultant procedural unconscionability generally associated with the

68

Small, 823 N.E.2d at 23.

69

Robin P. Bravchok, Nursing Home Tort Reform and Ohio House Bill 412: Why Have
We Abandoned Our Neglected and Abused Elderly Population?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645,
648 (2002-2003) (citing Frank B. Hobbs & Bonnie L. Damon, 65+ in the U.S., U.S. Bureau of
Census, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, 23-190 (Apr. 1996), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23-190.pdf.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2003)).
70

Krasuski, supra note 6, at 263-64.

71

Robin P. Bravchok, Nursing Home Tort Reform and Ohio House Bill 412: Why Have
We Abandoned Our Neglected and Abused Elderly Population?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 645,
648 (2002-2003) (citing Frank B. Hobbs & Bonnie L. Damon, 65+ in the U.S., U.S. Bureau of
Census, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, 23-190 (Apr. 1996), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23-190.pdf.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2003)).
72
See generally Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24 (stating that the stressful and hectic circumstances
surrounding the admissions process whereby Mrs. Small signed her husband’s admission
agreement that contained an arbitration clause contributed to the court’s finding of procedural
unconscionability).
73

See ZHAODONG, supra note 21, at 12.

74
See generally Small, 823 N.E.2d at 21 (concerning a procedurally unconscionable
admission agreement that was presented to Mrs. Small during a frantic admissions process).
75

See generally Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (suggesting that
while arbitration may be a feasible dispute resolution forum for businesses interacting with
one another, consumers fair poorly for several reasons - one of which is the unfamiliar nature
of the system itself).
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formation of these contracts, is further demonstrated by Small v. HCF of
Perrysburg.76
In Small, Mrs. Small unknowingly signed an admission agreement containing a
binding arbitration clause in the midst of a frantic admissions process.77 When Mrs.
Small arrived at HCF of Perrysburg to admit her husband, he was unconscious and
had to be immediately transported to a hospital.78 During this hectic experience,
HCF of Perrysburg presented Mrs. Small with an admission agreement which she
signed – unaware that it contained a legally-binding arbitration clause.79 Subsequent
to this incident, “while being transported, unrestrained, by wheelchair,”80 at HCF of
Perrysburg, Mr. Small “fell and sustained injuries”81 and died approximately nine
days later.82 Mr. Small’s death prompted Mrs. Small to file a complaint alleging
negligence on the part of HCF of Perrysburg which subsequently led to the discovery
of the binding arbitration clause contained within her husband’s admissions
agreement.83
In Small, the Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause was
procedurally unconscionable.84 The fact that “[w]hen Mrs. Small signed the
agreement she was under a great amount of stress;[ ]the agreement was not explained
to her; she did not have an attorney present; [she] did not have any particularized
legal experience[;] and [she] was 69 years old on the date the agreement was
signed”85 contributed to the court’s finding of procedural unconscionability. The
court further noted that the arbitration clause was troubling because it provided that
“the prevailing party [was] entitled to attorney fees,”86 which the court noted could
essentially discourage individuals from pursuing claims.87 Finally, the court
expressed overarching concerns regarding the use of arbitration as a method of
dispute resolution in negligence actions between individuals and businesses, and
warned that cases that entail agreements with similar stipulations require a close
judicial examination.88

76

Small, 823 N.E.2d at 19.

77

Id. at 24.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 21

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 21 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

84

Id. at 24.

85

Fortune, 843 N.E.2d at 1222 (citing Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24).

86

Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24.

87

See id.

88

See Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24-25. The court’s concern regarding arbitrating negligence
actions suggests that Ohio courts are not entirely satisfied with the general enforceability of
arbitration agreements in cases that involve allegations of negligence.
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In Small, Mrs. Small was able to obtain redress for her husband’s injuries in a
court of law because the arbitration clause was void for unconscionability. Mrs.
Small’s situation is therefore a fortunate example of piecemeal protectionism by state
courts.89 The number of nursing home residents in a similar situation that would be
unable to obtain such favorable results (for example, those without a spouse to
protect their interests) is unknown.90
2. Substantive Unconscionability
Another multifaceted aspect of arbitration that serves as an impediment to
potential nursing home litigants’ ability to obtain redress is substantive.
“Substantive unconscionability involves those factors which relate to the contract
terms themselves and whether they are commercially reasonable.”91 In nursing home
admission agreements, substantive unconscionability concerns: a) “loser pays”
provisions; b) the inability to modify terms or opt-out of provisions; c)
inconspicuous clauses; and d) the nursing home’s retained ability to go to court.
Courts tend to declare arbitration clauses in nursing home admission agreements
substantively unconscionable when the nursing home retains the right to go to court92
while the resident is forced to arbitrate, and when the contract contains a “loser pays”
provision.93
a. Standard “loser pays” provisions provide that if a resident proceeds with an
arbitral hearing and loses, the resident is responsible for the costs and attorney fees
expended by the nursing home in defending itself against the resident’s claim.94
These types of cost-shifting provisions are the most influential of the nursing home’s
89

The situation in Small represents a fortunate example of piecemeal protectionism by the
courts because this case involved a nursing home resident with a competent spouse to dispute
the resident’s interests in a court of law. Other situations may not entail a similarly equitable
outcome.
90
Although it is probably impossible to calculate how many nursing home residents in a
similar situation to Mr. Small would not obtain such a favorable court holding, it is possible to
speculate as to the lack of resources, and ability that would contribute to an extremely high
number of residents that would not be able to dispute the arbitration agreement.
91

Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 7.

92

Although nursing homes require residents to waive their right to go to trial after signing
the admission agreement containing an arbitration clause, nursing homes generally maintain
the right to go to court to litigate issues such as fees that they have not received from the
residents. It is intrinsically unfair for nursing homes to maintain the right to litigate issues
when they force residents to submit disputes to arbitration. This caveat also draws into
question the equity of the arbitral forum in general because, if it is as cost efficient, time
efficient and equitable as businesses insist that it is, why wouldn’t nursing homes seek a
judgment for the payment of fees owed in the adjudicatory forum?
93

See generally Small, 823 N.E.2d at 23-25 (holding (among other things) that the
arbitration clause in the nursing home admission agreement which contained a loser pays
provision requiring the resident to pay the facility’s attorney fees, and allowed the nursing
home to go to court to dispute fees while the resident was forced to submit all future dispute to
arbitration was substantively unconscionable).
94

See generally Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 4 (describing the general structure
and applicability of loser pays provisions in arbitration agreements).
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deterrents and are thus exceedingly prevalent.95 Moreover, loser pays provisions
potentially filter the most substantial amount of residents from pursuing redress in
the arbitral forum because a resident fears “that he or she will be saddled with the
facility’s costs and attorney’s fees clearly [ ] discourage the filing of a claim except
in the most obvious cases of negligence.”96 Additionally, “loser pays” provisions are
particularly controversial because in a court of law, generally “attorney’s fees are not
awarded to the prevailing party in a civil action unless ordered by the court.”97
In Fortune v. Castle Nursing Homes,98 the concept of loser pays provisions is
exemplified. In Fortune, the residency agreement’s arbitration clause was not
discovered until Fortune attempted to seek redress.99 Fortune “filed a lawsuit against
Castle alleging nursing home negligence after an aide, while assisting Fortune in the
shower room, allowed her to fall to the floor, causing injury to her leg.”100 In
Fortune, similar to Small, the arbitration clause was buried within the admissions
agreement and contained a “loser pays” provision101 requiring Fortune to pay
Castle’s costs and attorney fees if she lost at the arbitral hearing.
The Fifth District Court of Appeals held that the arbitration clause was
substantively unconscionable.102 Critical to the court’s finding was the fact that the
agreement contained a loser pays provision which this court also noted would have a
“stifling effect on the filing of claims.”103 Finally, the court adopted the Small
opinion’s cautionary language regarding the use of arbitration in cases involving
fact-intensive negligence claims and similarly noted its disapproval of the arbitral
forum for such disputes.104 Fortune epitomizes the problem of unregulated
arbitration in nursing homes and the inadequacy of piecemeal protectionism because
despite this and other similar cases, loser pays provisions are frequently utilized by
nursing homes.105

95
See Small, 823 N.E.2d at 23-24; see also Fortune, 843 N.E.2d at 1220-21; see also Brief
for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 4.
96

Fortune, 843 N.E.2d at 1220-21 (emphasis added).

97

Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24 (emphasis added).

98

Fortune, 843 N.E.2d at 1217.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 1220.

102

Id. at 1221.

103

Id.

104

See Fortune v. Castle Nursing Homes, Inc., 843 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ohio Ct. App.

2004).
105

See id. “Loser pays” provisions are clauses typically included in an arbitration
agreement that force the nursing home resident to agree that if they initiate the process of
arbitration and lose at the hearing, the resident is solely responsible for paying the costs and
fees that the nursing home expended in defending itself. Loser pays provisions are a
particularly fierce deterrent because 1) residents who seek redress for their injuries will first be
discouraged upon realizing that they cannot have a jury trial and must instead argue their case
in arbitration; and 2) residents will then have to weigh the pros and cons of proceeding and
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b. During the admissions process, residents are generally prohibited from
modifying undesirable terms or opting-out of specific provisions in the contract.106
These “take it or leave it” terms signify that the “arbitration clause . . . embodies
characteristics of adhesion,”107 which are denounced by courts and legislatures alike.
In addressing this specific issue, the Supreme Court of Ohio has recently stated that:
[T]he presumption in favor of arbitration should be substantially weaker
in a case . . . when there are strong indications that the contract at issue is
an adhesion contract, and the arbitration clause itself appears to be
adhesive in nature. In this situation, there arises considerable doubt that
any true agreement ever existed to submit disputes to arbitration.108
Nursing home admission agreements that resemble adhesion contracts have the
ability to deter individuals from pursuing claims because potential nursing home
residents faced with a “take it or leave it” option will generally be forced to take it.109
This “non-decision”110 forfeits a resident’s civil cause of action - consequently
deterring the benefits of litigation and subjecting residents to the obstacles of
arbitration which collectively hinder the attainment of redress.111
c. Closely related to the principle of adhesion is the concept of “meaningful
choice,” which “refers to the absence of a meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties to a contract, combined with contract terms that are unreasonably favorable to
one party.”112 Whether individuals are compelled to enter a nursing home, or choose
to enter a nursing home because of health complications, the decision rests almost
entirely on geographic location, bed availability and cost.113 The luxury of shopping
for a contract that contains the most favorable terms or the most equitable dispute

possibly having to pay for the costs of the nursing homes defense if they are not successful at
the hearing.
106
See Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24. See generally Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 14
(arguing that the arbitration agreement which did not allow for Day to opt-out of provisions
should be declared substantively unconscionable).
107

Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1179.

108

Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 11 (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. Aetna
Fin. Co. 700 N.E.2d 859, 473 (Ohio App. 1998)). The crux of this Note is that, in nursing
homes, there will very rarely, if ever, be a “true agreement” among the parties – primarily
because of the inherent nature of the environment, but secondarily because of the lack of
regulation that nursing home facilities have exploited through the utilization of
unconscionable practices such as hidden agreements, unexplained terms, loser pays
provisions, prohibitive costs, and adhesive terms.
109

See infra notes 110-11.

110

See Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 16.

111

In addition to deterring residents from the courts, adhesive terms may filter a number of
residents from the arbitral forum as well. This is because residents could believe that they
entered into a legitimate agreement with the nursing home facility that unfortunately binds
them to a less favorable forum but that they are not willing to undertake.
112

Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 5.

113

See generally Krasuski, supra note 6, at 263-64.
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resolution clause is rarely one enjoyed by individuals in need of a nursing home.114
Therefore, individuals seeking a nursing home facility to care for them, “in the throes
of what may be the biggest crisis of their lives,”115 inherently exercise no meaningful
choice in regards to whether or not to accept the terms of the contract accompanying
the desperately needed health care that they are seeking.
d. Frequently, arbitration clauses are inconspicuously buried within the general
text of admission agreements and lack formatting distinctions to set them apart from
the rest of the document.116 In a currently pending case, Day v. Waterford
Commons,117 not only was the clause buried on page twelve of a fourteen-page
document,118 but the facility utilized a checklist of issues to discuss with new
residents that explicitly excluded the arbitration clause.119 In Day, modifications to
the terms of the agreement were not permitted, Day was not accompanied by legal
counsel during the admissions process, and the details of the agreement were not
fully explained.120
While no decision has been rendered in this case to date, it represents the
recurring practices of nursing homes regarding admissions contracts containing
agreements that bind unknowing residents to the process of arbitrating future
disputes. Day illustrates the “bad faith” practices employed by nursing homes to
keep residents from litigating by intentionally concealing clauses and taking
affirmative steps to ensure that they are not detected.121 These deceptive practices
114
The lack of “meaningful choice” that individuals searching for an adequate nursing
home enjoy is exemplified by a comparison to the very meaningful choice exercised by
individuals in the employment context. Arbitration agreements in employment contracts are
litigated just as frequently as arbitration agreements in nursing home admission agreements so
it is a parallel comparison. In the employment scenario, potential employees (theoretically at
least) are able to job hunt. Individuals searching for a job are free to bypass a company with
an employment contract containing unfavorable terms such as a clause requiring employees to
submit future disputes to binding arbitration, and continue searching until a more desirable
employment contract can be located. In the employment context therefore, the true sense of
“meaningful choice” is exemplified. In comparison, potential nursing home residents seeking
medical care are not similarly capable of searching for the right contract until they find one
that they are willing to accept.
115

Hornstein, supra note 26, at 338.

116
See generally Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3 (explaining that the arbitration
clause in Day was located on page twelve of a fourteen page document and not distinguished
by a different formatting style to set it apart from the rest of the document).
117

Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3.

118

Id.

119

Id. at 5.

120

Id. at 5.

121

It is alarming that a nursing home facility would take affirmative steps to conceal an
arbitration agreement when the arbitral forum is supposedly 1) quick; 2) easy; 3) affordable; 4)
fair; and 5) just as good for consumers as litigating a similar claim in a court of law.
Waterford Commons’ affirmative steps to conceal the clause (by excluding it from an explicit
list of things to discuss with future residents) and including it on the twelfth page of a
fourteen-page admissions agreement lends credence to endless allegations that the arbitral
forum produces disparate results for consumers.
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effectively filter a number of residents that will not notice the clause or challenge its
validity, but will instead passively accept his or her inability to litigate.
e. Although arbitration clauses in nursing home admission agreements typically
force residents to waive their civil cause of action,122 the nursing home generally
retains the right (often explicitly) to go to court.123 The one-sided nature of this type
of clause is a classic example of the unfair terms124 that define the concept of
substantive unconscionability. In Small, the court held that this type of clause which allowed the nursing home, but not the resident to go to court - was
substantively unconscionable.125
Collectively, these various types of provisions define substantive
unconscionability and reinforce a power structure that has the potential of
intimidating residents and sustaining a perpetual system of deterrence. Small, Day
and Fortune involve issues of substantive and procedural unconscionability, cost
shifting, and bad faith that are permitted to persist because of a lack of arbitration
regulation in this environment.126 These cases illustrate only some of the problems
that saturate the process of nursing home residents contracting with nursing homes
and unknowingly agreeing to submit future claims to the process of arbitration. In
addition to procedural and substantive unconscionability, the exorbitant fees127
associated with consumers seeking redress through arbitration, and the statistically
slanted outcomes128 resulting from arbitration hearings, contributes to a system that
collectively works to deter potential nursing home litigants from pursuing legitimate
claims.

122

See ZHAODONG, supra note 21, at 12.

123

See Small, N.E.2d at 24-25; see generally Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 3-4
(arguing that it is substantively unconscionable for nursing homes to deny residents the right
to a jury trial meanwhile explicitly retaining the right to go to court to pursue their own
redress).
124

Small, 823 N.E.2d at 23.

125

See Id. at 23-24.

126

Because agreeing to a pre-dispute arbitration clause in nursing homes is not regulated
by the states, and because piecemeal protectionism in the courts is insufficient to deter nursing
home facilities from utilizing unconscionable practices, nursing homes continue to utilize
procedures such as burying clauses in the general text of a contract, providing minimal if any
explanation regarding the terms of the contract, prohibiting residents from opting-out or
modifying the terms of the contract, utilizing “loser pays provisions,” and scheduling
arbitration hearings in distant locations that may be difficult if not impossible for the typical
nursing home resident to get to. See Krasuski, supra note 6, at 269 (stating that “[s]ome
[arbitration] agreements have required that the arbitration take place in a distant state…”).
127
See infra notes 129, 134. “Arbitration has been found to be more expensive for
consumers than litigation, and its often-prohibitive fees, or forum costs, may serve to bar
consumers from pursuing claims at all. Even though some arbitration providers have recently
adopted consumer-friendly measures, defendants still benefit from arbitration because awards
issued by arbitrators tend to be lower than jury awards.” Krasuski, supra note 6, at 292-93.
128

See Krasuski, supra note 6, at 263.
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3. Prohibitive Costs
The costs of arbitration, which are considerably greater for consumers than a
comparable case litigated in a court of law,129 comprise another aspect of arbitration
that serves as an impediment to potential nursing home litigants seeking redress.
“[T]he potential costs of arbitrating . . . [a] dispute easily reach thousands, if not tens
of thousands, of dollars, far exceeding the costs that a plaintiff would incur in
court.”130 This cost disparity is due, in part, to the fact that although “[c]ourts charge
plaintiffs initial filing fees, . . . they do not charge extra for in-person hearings,
discovery requests, routine motions, or written decisions - costs that are all common
in the world of private arbitrators.”131
Recently, the Kaiser Family Foundation132 conducted a study that profiled
nursing home residents on Medicaid,133 finding that “the average cost of a private
nursing home bed in the U.S. was just over $6,000 a month in 2005.”134 The already
limited financial resources of elderly individuals,135 combined with the costs
associated with living in a nursing home,136 render it unlikely that many residents
could afford to pursue a claim in arbitration that may result in costs upwards of “tens
of thousands[] of dollars.”137 Despite the fact that these substantial costs are
generally not fully explained to residents, courts have held that prohibitive costs
alone are not enough to declare a contract substantively unconscionable.138
129
See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003); see generally
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (noting that the average daily
expense of employing an arbitrator is approximately $700) [hereinafter Green Tree].
130

Morrison, 317 F.3d at 669.

131

Id.

132

“The Kaiser Family Foundation is a non-profit, private operating foundation focusing
on the major health care issues facing the U.S., with a growing role in global health. Unlike
grant-making foundations, Kaiser develops and runs its own research and communications
programs, sometimes in partnership with other non-profit research organizations or major
media companies.” Kaiser Family Foundation (2008), http://www.kff.org/about/index2.cfm.
133
CLAUDIA WILLIAMS, JAMES ROSEN & KELLY O’MALLEY, PROFILES OF NURSING HOME
RESIDENTS ON MEDICAID (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7510.pdf.
134

Id. at 1. The study noted that the “high cost makes nursing home services affordable
for only the wealthiest Americans or those with private long-term care insurance. . . . [while]
Medicaid . . . covers nursing home care for low-income elderly or disabled individuals who
meet income and asset standards.” Id. at 1.
135

“The average income of an elderly individual (age 65 or older) in the United States in
2000 was $20,851, up from $12,239 in 1974, based on Employee Benefit Research Institute
(EBRI) tabulations of data from the March 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS). Average
income consists of the following sources: Social Security, pensions and annuities, assets,
earnings, and other.”
FACTS FROM EBRI – INCOME OF THE ELDERLY, (2002),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0602fact.pdf.
136

See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 133, at 1.

137

See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing the
average costs associated with obtaining care in a nursing home).
138

See Green Tree Fin. Corp-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 81 (2000).
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However, while prohibitive costs alone may not meet the standard for substantive
unconscionability, they are surely sufficient to effectively impede residents from
pursuing claims,139 especially those involving allegations of negligence.140
4. Slanted Outcomes
The rate at which individuals prevail in arbitration constitutes yet another aspect
of arbitration that serves to impede potential nursing home litigants from filing
claims. The outcomes of arbitration hearings are statistically less favorable for
consumers141 than businesses. This disparity may be exacerbated in nursing homes
which retain skilled arbitrators that are accustomed to defending the facility.
Residents that are aware of the rate at which consumers lose in arbitration may be
deterred from pursuing uncertain claims.142
The American Arbitration Association (AAA)143 reports statistics and up-to-date
information regarding a multitude of issues surrounding the process of arbitration.144
According to AAA reports based on consumer cases awarded between January 2007
and August 2007, 48 percent of consumers prevailed in cases in which they were the
claimant while 74 percent of businesses prevailed in cases in which they were the
claimant.145 These statistics unveil additional evidence that arbitration is not working

139

See Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1177 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

140

Residents will be especially deterred from pursuing redress in the arbitral forum for a
negligence claim because negligence claims are fact intensive and thus consist of substantial
amounts of discovery and hearings. Because arbitration charges individuals on an “al a carte”
basis, separately for different procedures (such as hearings, motions and written opinions)
residents could be deterred from incurring these costs and thus forgo their negligence claims
altogether.
141

See Krasuski, supra note 6, at 263.

142

See infra note 145.

143

The American Arbitration Association (AAA), with its long history and experience in
the field of alternative dispute resolution, provides services to individuals and organizations
who wish to resolve conflicts out of court. The AAA role in the dispute resolution process is
to administer cases, from filing to closing. The AAA provides administrative services in the
U.S., as well as abroad through its International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR). The
AAA's and ICDR's administrative services include assisting in the appointment of mediators
and arbitrators, setting hearings, and providing users with information on dispute resolution
options, including settlement through mediation. Ultimately, the AAA aims to move cases
through arbitration or mediation in a fair and impartial manner until completion. Additional
AAA services include the design and development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
systems for corporations, unions, government agencies, law firms, and the courts. The
Association also provides elections services as well as education, training, and publications for
those seeking a broader or deeper understanding of alternative dispute resolution. American
Arbitration Association, About Us, http://www.adr.org/about.
144
145

Id.

Id.; see also JOHN O’DONNELL, THE ARBITRATION TRAP, HOW CREDIT CARD
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS (2007), http://www.citizen.org/documents/final_wcover.pdf
(discussing an NAF study that reported that 95% of the time arbitration ends in favor of the
business in credit card disputes).
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for consumers in that they statistically end up on the losing end of arbitration awards
whether they initiate the legal process, or have it initiated against them.
The deterrent effects of procedural and substantive unconscionability, prohibitive
costs, and slanted outcomes cannot be considered in isolation, however. These
deterrents must be assessed in light of the typical claim146 brought by the typical
claimant147 in a nursing home. These factors magnify the impact of the
aforementioned deterrents as well as bolster further support for congressional
amendment to allow regulation of arbitration in nursing homes.
B. The Deterrent Effects of Arbitration are Magnified in Nursing Homes
1. The Typical Claimant
The demographic profile of the typical claimant in the nursing home environment
magnifies the impact that procedurally and substantively unconscionable practices,
combined with prohibitive costs and slanted outcomes, have on deterring nursing
home residents from pursuing claims. The average age and physical and mental
condition of the typical nursing home resident plays a significant role in their ability
to adequately understand and effectively participate in the process of arbitration.
Relevant data demonstrates that:
[a]ccording to the 1997 National Nursing Home Survey, there were
1,465,000 residents age 65 and older in nursing homes (about 4.3 percent
of the U.S. population age 65 and older in 1997). Nearly three-fourths of
these residents were women, and about one-half were age 85 and older.
In 1997, about 75 percent of all nursing home residents 65 and older
required assistance in three or more activities of daily living, including
bathing, dressing, eating, transferring from bed to chair, and using the
toilet. About 42 percent of nursing home residents were diagnosed with
dementia, and 12 percent had other psychiatric conditions, such as
schizophrenia and mood disorders.148
It seems self evident that if an individual is unable to feed, dress, or bathe without
considerable assistance from nursing home staff, or is suffering from a psychological
condition such as dementia, that that individual is similarly unable to form a valid
agreement to submit future disputes to arbitration, successfully navigate the process
of arbitration, or obtain adequate redress in that system.149

146
The typical claim brought by a nursing home resident is for negligence, usually
involving the resident falling and sustaining injuries as a result.
147

See infra note 148.

148
Sheel Pandya, Nursing Homes, Feb. 2001, http://www.aarp.org/research/longtermcare/
ursingomes/research-import-669-FS10R.html (emphasis added).
149

“Not uncommonly, residents have diminished capacity, or are admitted to nursing
homes from hospitals while suffering from debilitating conditions and cannot reasonably be
expected to participate in the admissions process, much less to fully comprehend admissions
agreements.” Krasuski, supra note 6, at 276.
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2. The Typical Claim
The nature of the typical claim brought by nursing home residents also magnifies
the impact of procedural and substantive unconscionability, prohibitive costs, and
slanted outcomes. “The majority of cases which have been brought by nursing home
residents have been based in negligence, usually involving a fall.”150 Negligence
claims are especially vulnerable to arbitration because they typically require lengthy
fact finding procedures151 which are neither practically nor economically amenable to
the process of arbitration. Arbitration hearings are additionally problematic because
“determinations of negligence . . . are subject to the ‘reasonable person’ standard,
[which is] typically the province of jurors.”152
Although arbitration is generally encouraged as a “method to settle disputes,”153
“courts [do] tend . . . to view agreements to arbitrate negligence actions more
cautiously.”154 This judicial caution may be in response to the fact that many
potential nursing home litigants, faced with the reality that conducting a meaningful
hearing for a negligence claim could cost tens of thousands of dollars,155 will
unquestionably be deterred from proceeding. The problems associated with
initiating a negligence action in the arbitral forum are compounded if the arbitration
agreement contains a loser pays provision, thus putting the resident in a “catch 22” type of cost/benefit analysis.156 The effect of this misfortune is that claimants with
expendable finances, resources and endurance will be able to successfully navigate
the process of arbitration, while more meritorious claims may be lost in the journey.
The prohibitive costs of arbitration, unregulated by the states, thus function as a
filtering device working to the advantage of nursing homes and the detriment of
residents.
V. THE FUTURE PLIGHT OF NURSING HOME RESIDENTS
“In 2003, 1.5 million people 65 and older lived in nursing homes[;] [i]f the
current rates continue, by 2030 this number will rise to about 3 million.”157 As the
150

Charles A. Lattanzi, Nursing Home Contracts: Is it Time for Bad Faith to Come out of
Retirement?, 6 J.L. & HEALTH 61, 70 (1991-1992).
151

See Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

152

Krasuski, supra note 6, at 298 (citing PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS
(2002), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF110A.pdf).

OF

153

Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1167.

154

Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 6 (citing Small, 823 N.E.2d at 29).

155

Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 669 (6th Cir. 2003).

ARBITRATION

156

For example, if the resident puts forth a genuine attempt to succeed at the arbitral
hearing (with all the bells and whistles of a true negligence hearing), the resident is more
likely to prevail but will incur extensive costs in doing so. On the other hand, if the resident
skimps at the hearing in an attempt to save money, he or she is faced with the possibility of
losing and then subsequently the possibility of being subjected to a loser pays provision.
Either option available to residents therefore results in expending a considerable about of
money and effort to obtain what will probably amount to inadequate redress.
157

Falls in Nursing Homes, http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/factsheets/nursing.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2008).
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number of residents in nursing homes escalates, so too will the incentives for
facilities to maximize the administrative conveniences at their disposal. Therefore,
procedurally and substantively unconscionable practices will naturally increase as
the number of residents (and thus the number of potential litigants) increases.
Moreover, in August 2007, “Bush administration officials sa[id] that Medicare
will no longer pay the extra costs of treating preventable errors, injuries and
infections that occur in hospitals.”158 Essentially, Medicare decided not to pay for
treatment related to “conditions that could reasonably have been prevented.”159
“Among the conditions that will be affected [by the new policy] are bedsores[;] or
pressure ulcers, and injuries caused by falls.”160 Following suit are private insurers
which are expected to adopt similar coverage policies in the near future.161
The new Medicare policy focuses on conditions acquired after an individual is
admitted to a hospital that could have been reasonably prevented – specifically
hospital acquired infections.162 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention163
approximates that hospital-acquired infections are responsible for 1.7 million
infections developed by patients in hospitals each year.164 Contributing to the death
of approximately 270 persons a day,165 hospital-acquired infections represent a
liability in hospitals comparable to that of injuries sustained from negligently
incurred falls in nursing homes. It is estimated that “each year, a typical nursing
home with 100 beds reports 100 to 200 falls,”166 with many more unreported.167
158
Robert Pear, Medicare Says It Won’t Cover Hospital Errors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2007, at A1 (discussing the newly adopted Medicare policies).
159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id.

162

Id.

163

The “CDC is the nation's premiere health promotion, prevention, and preparedness
agency and a global leader in public health. It remains at the forefront of public health efforts
to prevent and control infectious and chronic diseases, injuries, workplace hazards,
disabilities, and environmental health threats. CDC is globally recognized for conducting
research and investigations and for its action-oriented approach. CDC applies research and
findings to improve people’s daily lives and responds to health emergencies—something that
distinguishes CDC from its peer agencies. CDC works with states and other partners to
provide a system of health surveillance to monitor and prevent disease outbreaks (including
bioterrorism), implement disease prevention strategies, and maintain national health statistics.
CDC also guards against international disease transmission, with personnel stationed in more
than 25 foreign countries. CDC is now focusing on achieving the four overarching Health
Protection Goals to become a more performance-based agency focusing on healthy people,
healthy places, preparedness, and global health. CDS is one of the 13 major operating
components of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).” Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Present and Future, http://www.cdc.gov/about/history/ourstory.htm.
164

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Antimicrobial Resistance in Healthcare
Settings, http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/ar.html.
165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id.
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Considering the new coverage policies developed by Medicare applicable to
hospitals, it could be a natural progression for Medicare to develop similar policies
applicable to nursing homes and residents that sustain preventable injuries while
under the care of the facility. Applying this policy to nursing homes would result in
Medicare refusing to pay for new conditions developed by residents after being
admitted to a nursing home, such as falls, that could have been reasonably prevented.
The implications of Medicare (and possibly private insurers as well) refusing to
cover these types of conditions would be devastating for nursing home residents.
Residents that sustain preventable injuries such as falls at a nursing home, that are
bound by an admission agreement to submit disputes to the process of arbitration
(wrought with the various aforementioned obstacles and deficiencies), will be
without a remedy if their injuries are not covered by either the arbitral award,
Medicare, or their private insurer. The very real possibility of this dilemma suggests
that the already inequitable system of agreeing to arbitration in nursing homes is set
to worsen in the near future, thus mandating legislative amendment.
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION: A PARALLEL TO THE MCCARRAN ACT168
A. Congress Should Consent to State Regulation
Two public policy rationales are typically advanced to explain legislative
endorsement of arbitration as an adequate alternative to litigation.169 First, it is
argued that arbitration has the potential to “ease court caseloads and contribute to a
better allocation of judicial resources.”170 Second, it is argued that “arbitration would
confer a number of advantages upon the contracting parties, such as providing a
quicker, less expensive and more flexible mode of adjudication than litigation.”171
These objectives constitute the social underpinnings of the Federal Arbitration Act as
well as its judicial endorsement. The potential benefits of arbitration however, if
realized at all,172 are substantially outweighed by the inequity of forcing nursing
home residents to adhere to the fine print of an inherently unconscionable agreement.

168

15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2008) (providing that “a) the business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several states which relate to the regulation
or taxation of such business[; and] b) no Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance: Provided, that after June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2,
1809, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended . . . , shall be applicable. The business of insurance to the extent
that such business is not regulated by State law”).
169

ZHAODONG, supra note 21, at 13.

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Whether similar advantages are achieved when consumers agree to arbitrate claims
with businesses is a relentlessly disputed issue among commentators. See Ernst & Young,
supra note 57, at 2. Despite corporate attempts to legitimate the practice of arbitrating
consumer claims, studies have failed to sufficiently verify allegations that the process is as
equitable for consumers as a comparable case litigated before a jury. See generally F. PAUL
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Enacting legislation similar to the McCarran Act, which declares “that the
continued regulation . . . by the [s]everal states of the business of insurance is in the
public interest,”173 essentially “assures continued state authority over insurance,”174
and “exempt[s] the insurance industry from Commerce Clause constrictions.”175 The
McCarran Act has enabled states to regulate insurance since 1945 and the utilization
of arbitration as an adjudicatory alternative to litigation has not declined. In fact,
since the McCarran Act’s passage, the use of arbitration has increased.176 This piece
of legislation proves that it is within Congress’ capacity to exempt nursing home
regulation from the strictures of the FAA without diminishing the statute’s purpose.
In the context of nursing homes, enacting parallel legislation to that of the
McCarran Act would alleviate the crisis triggered by the enforceability of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. The pertinent doctrine established by the McCarran Act
provides that:
it will prevent a federal statute from preempting a state statute if (1) the
federal statute does not specifically relate to the business of insurance, (2)
the state law was enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, and (3) the federal statute operates to invalidate, impair, or
supersede the state law.177
A comparable piece of legislation for nursing homes would prevent a federal statute
(such as the FAA) from preempting a state statute if: 1) the federal statute does not
specifically relate to the business of nursing homes (which the FAA does not, it
specifically relates to arbitration); 2) the state law was enacted for the purpose of
regulating the business of nursing homes (which regulations surrounding the

BLAND, JR., MICHAEL J. QUIRK, LESLIE A. BAILEY, RICHARD H. FRANKEL &
JONATHAN SHELDON, CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 2 (4TH ed. 2006).
To the contrary, statistics show that arbitration is often less flexible and more expensive for
individuals than litigation. See generally Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 669, 66970 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that arbitration can be nearly fifty times more expensive for
consumers than a comparable case in litigation) (citing Public Citizen, The Costs of
Arbitration 40-42 (2002)). See generally Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1177,
1178-84 (Ohio App. Div. 2004) (discussing the exorbitant costs of arbitration compared to
litigation for consumers, the effect of costs and arbitration generally on indigent claimants,
and the adhesive nature of admission agreements that contain arbitration clauses).
173

KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
237 (Robert C. Clark, et al., ed., Thomson West 2007) (1937) (emphasis added) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1012 (2008)).
174

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 173, at 238.

175

Id. at 238-39.

176
“Between 1996 and 2002 [especially], total arbitration filings reported by the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) more than doubled.” Katherine Benesch, The Increasing Use
of Arbitration and Mediation in Adjudicating Health Care Cases, 245 APR N.J. LAW. 28, 28
(2007) (discussing the rate at which the use of arbitration has increased and contributory
reasons).
177

In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d at 279, 288.
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admission process would qualify as);178 and 3) the federal statute operates to
invalidate, impair, or supersede the state law (which the FAA has historically done
and will continue to do without legislation exempting nursing homes). Moreover, in
enacting the McCarran Act, Congress expressed a rationale that permitting states to
maintain close control of the business of insurance was “in the public interest.”179
Surely, if the business of insurance is in the public interest, the business of nursing
homes aptly qualifies and should be entitled to similar “reverse pre-empt[ive]”180
treatment.
Additional support for enacting parallel legislation to the McCarran Act that
would enable states to regulate nursing homes is found in In re Kepka.181 That case
involved an insurance regulation that required arbitration clauses in nursing home
agreements to meet certain specified standards of conspicuity. The Texas Court of
Appeals held that the McCarran Act “prevents the FAA from pre-empting . . . [the
insurance regulation’s] notice requirements.”182
A federal scheme that permits insurance regulations to mandate notice
requirements in nursing home admission agreements,183 while simultaneously
denying that authority to the legislature generally, is illogical. This caveat brings
Justice Black’s assertions in Prima Paint that the FAA’s general enforceability
“elevates arbitration provisions above all other contractual provisions” to fruition,
proffering exceeding support for congressional consent to state regulation.
VII. PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR STATES
Delineating stringent guidelines for the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
nursing home admission agreements could serve the policy goals of arbitration184
more effectively than the current piecemeal interpretation being utilized by courts.
For instance, a rigid set of guidelines could make it quicker and easier for courts to
eliminate appropriate cases in the summary judgment phase185 as well as enable

178

Recognizing that pre-dispute arbitration agreements in contexts other than nursing
homes (for example, employment contexts or credit card agreements) may exhibit similar
deficiencies and inequities, the scope of this Note suggests only that states should be exempted
in terms of regulating the process of agreeing to arbitrate future claims in nursing home
admission agreements.
179

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 173, at 237 (discussing the history and
enactment of the McCarran Act as well as Congressional intent).
180

In re Kepka, 178 S.W.3d at 288.

181

Id. (discussing the circumstances under which the FAA does not preempt arbitration
notice requirements in light of the McCarran Act).
182

Id.

183

The ability of arbitration notice requirements to be implemented through the insurance
industry by states is misleading – in all regards the goals and policies of regulating contracts in
the insurance industry are significantly different than the goals and policies of regulating
contracts in the nursing home industry.
184
185

See Ernst & Young, supra note 57, at 4.

If the nursing home violates an explicitly enumerated rule, it would be easy to
determine that a trial was the appropriate adjudicatory forum. Conversely, if no rule has been

400

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 22:375

nursing homes to conform to rules that would help to minimize the expense of
litigating the validity of the arbitration clause.186 Strict guidelines would also help
ensure that nursing home residents are protected from unconscionable procedures
that extinguish their ability to obtain redress in a court of law. Finally, narrowly
tailored guidelines for the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home
admission agreements would ensure that the legislation exempting nursing home
regulation from the FAA was confined explicitly to the context of nursing homes,
thus sustaining the viability of arbitration and the FAA. The ideal guidelines would
include some combination of the following seven components.
First, the ideal guidelines would require administrators to thoroughly explain
arbitration clauses to a competent person, either the future resident or the future
resident’s guardian, in a consistent manner.187 Ensuring that every resident is
genuinely informed of what the agreement entails will protect residents from the
deceptive practices associated with nursing home admission agreements.
Additionally, instituting this guideline could reduce claims regarding inconspicuous
clauses and bad faith inducements to agree to submitting future disputes to
arbitration.
Second, ideal guidelines would enable residents to modify terms of the
agreement as well as opt-out of specific provisions. Allowing residents to alter terms
and provisions will eliminate the adhesive nature of typical nursing home admission
agreements.188 Additionally, this guideline would help ensure that a genuine meeting
of the minds was reached – that a “true agreement existed to submit disputes to

violated, arbitration could proceed. Discerning whether a rule was violated would be easier to
assess because of a clearly defined standard enunciated by the state legislature.
186

The expense of defending against suits surrounding the validity of the arbitration clause
itself could be substantially minimized by a set of detailed guidelines because whether the
nursing home violated the law would be easily ascertainable by a simple assessment of their
standard contract language. Instead of having an entire hearing on whether the arbitration
agreement was conscionable, its validity could be easily determined at the summary judgment
phase. Moreover, nursing homes could easily conform their conduct to the standards if courts
weren’t continuously deciding cases inconsistently as to the conspicuity of arbitration
agreements. As the situation currently stands, it could be legitimately difficult for nursing
homes to conform to a standard since a clear one has not been delineated by the courts.
187
This requirement could be easily and uniformly fulfilled by administering an
educational video on the details of agreeing to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement and
surrendering the right to litigate in a court of law. The video could be administered during the
process of admission and the person would then sign off that they had viewed tape and
understand the material.
188

Allowing residents to modify the terms of this type of agreement is critical - it is not
unreasonable to allow residents to modify terms in the contract that concerns the health care
that could possibly take them through the remainder of their life. However, this right should
consist of additional guidelines for nursing homes to follow because enabling residents to
modify terms or opt-out of provisions might motivate nursing homes to barter with clauses,
terms and services, again reinforcing a skewed power structure to the detriment of residents.
States should require nursing homes to allow residents to modify terms or opt-out of
provisions and similarly ensure that nursing homes do not attempt to fix a “price” to be paid
by nursing home residents that in fact do choose to modify the terms of the agreement.
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arbitration,”189 which will in turn reduce litigation surrounding the validity of the
arbitration agreement.
Third, ideal guidelines would prohibit fee shifting to residents that do not prevail
at the arbitral hearing. In litigation, it is the court’s province to make determinations
regarding whether the losing party should pay the victor’s attorney’s fees and
costs.190 Furthermore, the court’s determination is not an arbitrary decision, but is
reached through thoughtful analysis, channeled by pertinent statutory law.
Therefore, it is intrinsically inequitable to allow a partial party to an arbitration
hearing to determine the circumstances and allocation of costs and attorney’s fees in
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.191
Fourth, ideal regulations would require that the arbitration agreement be
presented to the resident in a document completely separate from the rest of the
admission agreement. This guideline will provide additional safeguards for residents
and nursing homes alike because physically separating the documents will minimize,
if not entirely eliminate suits claiming that the arbitration clause was buried in the
agreement or inconspicuous in nature. Additionally, this guideline will protect
nursing homes from conflicting interpretations regarding what constitutes an
inconspicuous clause.192 Furthermore, drawing special attention to the arbitration
agreement will help guarantee that residents appreciate the importance of the
document and take time to review it carefully before signing.
Fifth, ideal regulations would establish guidelines for the costs associated with
arbitration. Regulating the exorbitant costs of arbitration for consumers so that the
expense of proceeding in this forum is as cost efficient as proceeding in a court of
law could significantly diminish the deterrent effects that the prohibitive costs of
arbitration entail. Furthermore, regulating the costs to more closely resemble the
costs of litigation in a court of law would put the parties to the arbitration hearing on
a more level playing field for purposes of endurance and financial capability to
initiate claims and endure the process of arbitration.
Sixth, the ideal regulation would require arbitration firms to “reveal [ ]
information . . . about their use of arbitration and the win-lose rate of corporations

189

Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 11 (citing Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co. 700
N.E.2d 859, 473 (Ohio App. 1998)).
190

See Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, 823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio App. Div. 2004).

191

In a court of law, an impartial fact finder determines whether a party is or should be
entitled to having the other party pay their court costs and/or attorney fees. In the arbitral
forum, to allow parties to determine who will pay costs before a hearing is held, or what’s
more, before a dispute arises is a wholly inequitable system to impose on consumers. Worse,
however, is when this type of provision is imposed on nursing home residents that were not
aware that they had agreed to submit future disputes to arbitration in their admissions
agreement in the first place.
192

When deciding cases of unconscionability in nursing home admission agreements
containing pre-dispute arbitration clauses, courts routinely decide cases based on the facts of
the case before them. This system, while it affords the parties to the case some measure of
relief, does not provide an objective standard for nursing homes to model their agreements
after. Proposing guidelines will eliminate this ambiguity and allow nursing home residents
exactly what constitutes an unconscionable provision and similarly, exactly what constitutes
adequate notice in the nursing home context.
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and consumers.”193 Currently, California is the only state that requires arbitration
firms to reveal their practices194 and even California’s policy is lacking in that it does
not regulate the manner in which this information must be revealed. State
legislatures should require arbitration firms to report this information so that an
accurate assessment of consumer arbitration can be established for purposes of
regulating this process.
Finally, the ideal regulation would require a rescission period of at least 30 days
before the agreement could be deemed valid.195 Including a rescission period affords
residents a chance to change their mind or consult with legal counsel.196 Conversely,
the rescission period would essentially provide nursing homes with an affirmative
defense that the resident agreed to arbitration, had an opportunity to rescind and did
not, again minimizing litigation surrounding the enforceability of the agreement.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Casarotto, the Supreme Court enunciated that Montana’s notice requirement
conflicted with the “goals and policies of the FAA.”197 The inequities associated
with the process of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing homes, however,
confirm that the FAA’s “goals and policies”198 conflict with “accepted principles of
contract law”199 in this context. Long standing principles of contract law that predate the FAA, as well as basic human morality, should supersede the interests of
efficiency and convenience purportedly served by the general enforceability of the
statute.
State case law as well as attempted state legislation already evince an underlying
public policy to protect nursing home residents from the harsh effects of

193

O’Donnell, supra note 145, at 5

194

Id. at 5-6.

195

See generally Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tenn. 1996) (describing an
arbitration agreement with a thirty (30) day rescission period that the court approved).
Persons faced with the life changing moment and perhaps dire necessity of being admitted to a
nursing home facility to care for them should be afforded the opportunity to ponder the new
and unfamiliar process, secure legal consultation, and then subsequently change their mind, if
necessary, to avoid unconscionability.
196
Allowing time for a rescission period would be especially beneficial in circumstances
where individuals were forced to hurriedly proceed with admission and could not thoroughly
assess the agreement or consult with an attorney (similar to Small).
197

See Doctor’s Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (holding that Montana’s
state statute regulating the notice requirements of arbitration agreements, as well as any
legislation that would single out arbitration agreements for special treatment aside from that
given generally to contracts, was invalid as conflicting with the goals and policies of the FAA
to put arbitration on the same footing as other contracts).
198
199

See Id.

See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967) (Black,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s holding in Prima Paint that the FAA was intended
to broadly enforce arbitration agreements violated accepted principles of contract law –
meaning that the broad rule could potentially enforce agreements in which no true “meeting of
the minds was reached”).
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unconscionable arbitration agreements.200 Despite court decisions declaring certain
practices unconscionable,201 however, nursing homes continue to employ these
procedures.202 It is therefore Congress’ obligation to recognize this impropriety and
grant relief – possibly in the form of legislation similar to the McCarran Act that
would essentially consent to state regulation of nursing home admission agreements.
Moreover, legislative relief would serve policy interests by providing an efficient,
inexpensive, and fair forum for dispute resolution; pursue the goals of states by
protecting residents; and open the door of redress that had previously been closed or
impossible to reach for many nursing home residents. This legislation is vital to
nursing home residents because whatever Congress meant when it sought to make
arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts;203 and whatever the
Supreme Court meant when it interpreted the FAA to apply to consumer disputes in
federal and state court,204 surely – it did not mean this.205

200

See Fortune v. Castle Nursing Homes, 843 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ohio App. Div. 2005)
(holding that a nursing home arbitration agreement that contained a loser pays provision
requiring the nursing home resident to pay the nursing home’s attorney fees if the resident did
not prevail at the arbitration hearing was substantively); see also Small v. HCF of Perrysburg,
823 N.E.2d 19, 24 (Ohio App. Div. 2004) (holding that an arbitration agreement that
contained a loser pays provision, was presented to the spouse of the future resident in a frantic
admissions process and was not explained to the spouse was procedurally unconscionable);
see also Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (concerning a Montana state statute that attempted to require
certain notice requirements in conjunction with arbitration agreements to attempt to protect
consumers that did not knowingly agree to the pre-dispute arbitration clause.
201

See Fortune, 842 N.E.2d at 1221 (discussing the unconscionability of loser pays
provisions); see also Small, 823 N.E.2d at 24 (discussing the unconscionability of the process
of nursing homes admissions when the person signing the contract is under a great amount of
stress; the agreement is not adequately explained (or explained at all), the person is not
accompanied by legal counsel, the person does not possess any legal experience, and the
person is of progressed age).
202

See Brief for the Plaintiff, supra note 14, at 11. In Day, this currently pending case
represents that despite court decisions that continually invalidate arbitration agreements that
contain “loser pays provisions,” nursing home facilities continue to utilize them as a part of
their residency contracts. This anomaly proves the point that inconsistent court opinions and a
lack of state regulation in this field produce a substantially negative impact for nursing home
residents. This case also proves the point that piecemeal protectionism by the state court
decisions is insufficient to adequately protect nursing home residents from the many
unconscionable practices of nursing home facilities.
203
See generally 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2008), (stating that “a written provision in any
maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract”) (emphasis added).
204

See generally Doctor’s Assoc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (reaffirming the
rule in Prima Paint that Congress intended the FAA to apply broadly and bring arbitration
agreements to the same level as contracts); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 272-74 (1995) (reaffirming the general enforceability rule of the FAA
established in Prima Paint); see also Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Jr.
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Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989) (adopting the Court’s language in Keating and again
endorsing the general enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA as established in
Prima Paint); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (holding that the FAA’s
generally enforceability preempted a California law regarding arbitration); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. at 10-14 (1984) (stating that the FAA is applicable to consumers in federal
and state court pursuant to the general enforceability of the FAA under Congress’ Commerce
Clause authority); see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
25-26 (1983) (reaffirming the idea that the general enforceability of the FAA creates federal
substantive law establishing a “duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate,”); see also Prima
Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-406 (establishing the bedrock principle relied upon in subsequent
opinions that the FAA creates substantive law binding on both federal and state courts under
Congress’ Commerce Clause authority and that Congress intended to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as regular contracts when it enacted the FAA).
205

See generally Waverly-Arkansas, Inc. v. Keener, No. CA-07-524, slip op. at 1 (Ark. Ct.
App. Feb. 6, 2008) (holding that “the arbitration agreement was invalid . . . [and] that the
arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion and that the circumstances surrounding its
execution rendered it unconscionable”); Covenant Health & Rehabilitation of Picayune v.
Lumpkin, No. 2007-CA-00449, slip op. at 2 (Miss. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2008) (“finding that
Lumpkin’s daughter possessed the capacity to bind her mother to arbitration, that there existed
sufficient consideration to support the creation of the arbitration clause, that Lumpkin’s
daughter was not fraudulently induced into signing the admissions agreement, and that the
admissions agreement was and the arbitration clause are substantively conscionable”); Cmty
Care Ctr of Vicksburg v. Mason, No. 2006-CA-00599, slip op. at 222-225 (Miss. Ct. App.
Oct. 9, 2007) (enforcing a nursing home admissions agreement that contained a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement and forcing Mrs. Mason to seek redress in the arbitral forum for injuries
sustained after being physically attacked by another resident at the nursing home, even though
she had entered the home with several significant health problems and after having recently
lost her husband); Brief for the Plaintiff , supra note 14, at 3-5 (regarding a nursing home
admissions process that included a list of things for the nursing home administrator to discuss
with potential residents, but explicitly excluded mentioning the arbitration clause); Fortune,
843 N.E.2d 1216 (regarding a nursing home resident that unknowingly agreed to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement in her nursing home resident contract that required her to reimburse the
nursing home’s attorney fees and costs if she lost her case at the arbitration hearing); Sloan v.
Nat’l Healthcorp., No. M2005-01273-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 30,
2006) (holding that even “after engaging in four months of discovery,” the defendant nursing
home could file a motion to compel arbitration, and “that a defendant may assert that a dispute
must be arbitrated and, in the alternative, demand a jury, without losing its right to
arbitration”); Cleveland v. Mann, No. 2005-CA-00924, slip op. at 111 (Miss. Nov. 30, 2006)
(holding that an arbitration agreement was not substantively unconscionable, was not
procedurally unconscionable, was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, and was binding on
the patient’s beneficiaries even though he signed after undergoing a substantial surgery and
was not represented by legal counsel during the course of the agreement); Small, 823 N.E.2d
19 (regarding a 69 year old woman who was rushed into unknowingly signing a nursing home
admission agreement for her husband that contained a binding pre-dispute arbitration clause,
requiring Mrs. Small to reimburse the nursing home’s attorney fees and costs if she lost at the
arbitration hearing). These cases represent only a small portion of current cases surrounding
the enforceability or unconscionability of nursing home arbitration agreements. These cases
also represent the inconsistencies that are produced as a result of a lack of regulation in this
environment. Although some courts afford residents relief from the arbitration agreement,
others do not. No clear standard of notice or unconscionability can be discerned from these
cases. These cases proffer further evidence that new legislation is needed, specifically
regarding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in nursing homes, specifically provided by the
state legislatures.

